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Firm Size and the Information Content of 
Over-the-Counter Common Stock Offerings
Robert M. Hull 
George E. Pinches
We examine the announcement period of stock returns for 179 over-the-counter 
(OTC) firms that issue common stock to reduce nonconvertible debt. We find 
that small OTC firms experience returns that are significantly more negative 
than large OTC firms. Regression tests reveal that firm size is a significant factor 
in accounting for stock returns. Other tests establish as firm size a dominant 
efiect. Our support for a firm size effect is consistent with a differential informa­
tion effect given that firm size is positively related to the amount of information 
available about firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A “pure” leverage decrease (e.g., a stock offering that reduces debt) alters 
the mix of the firm’s securities without directly modifying the asset struc­
ture. Consequently, a pure leverage decrease announcement should be rel­
atively firee fi'om valuation effects that can occur when a security offering 
raises proceeds for asset structure changes. Prior research (Copeland 8c Lee, 
1991; Cornett & Travlos, 1989; Hull, 1994; Hull & Fortin, 1993; Hull & 
Moellenberndt, 1994; Israel, Ofer, 8c Siegel, 1989; Masulis, 1983) docu­
ments significant negative announcement period stock returns for pure 
leverage decreases. This research generally concludes that the negative 
returns are caused by negative valuation effects consistent with signaling- 
models (Fama, 1985; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) premised on infor­
mation asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
The pure leverage decrease research (and stock offering research in 
general) offers no evidence that firm size accounts for the negative 
announcem ent period stock returns. The possibility that firm size can 
explain stock returns should be explored given that a number of studies
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(Atiase, 1985; Banz, 1981; Chari, Jaganathan, & Ofer, 1988, Chandy, Feavy, 
8c Reichenstein, 1993) show firm size to be a determinant of returns for sit­
uations other than security offerings. To the extent firm size proxies for the 
amount of information activities (e.g., information gathering, processing, 
reporting, and interpreting), the findings of these studies are consistent 
with models predicated on differential information (Atiase, 1980; Klein & 
Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975).
In this study, we examine 179 pure leverage decreases consisting of 
over-the-counter (OTC) common stock offerings that retire nonconvertible 
debt. We find that small OTC firms experience announcement period stock 
returns that are significandy more negative than the returns found for large 
OTC firms. The difference is consistent with the notion that less is known 
about small firms. This causes a negative announcement (such as a pure 
leverage decrease announcement) to be more informative, and thus more 
negative, for small firms.
We perform regression tests on the total sample and find that variables 
representing firm size best account for stock returns. For regression tests on 
that half of the sample with the smallest firm sizes, we discover signaling 
effects based on changes in insider holdings and banker actions. Regression 
tests for the large firm size half offer support for signaling effects caused by 
the relative change in the debt level.
We conduct additional tests on samples designed so that signaling 
effects (namely, those resulting firom changes in insider ownerships, banker 
actions, and debt levels) are not expected to impact the outcome. A differ­
ential information effect stemming firom firm size is still evident. Finally, we 
offer evidence that the negative effect resulting from firm size may be at 
least partially explained by the fact issuance expenses are more cosdy for 
smaller OTC firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
reviews theories that predict stock price behavior for pure leverage 
decreases. In the third section, we present the data, methodology, and pri­
mary tests. The fourth section contains the empirical results, while the final 
section offers summary statements.
II. COMPETING MODELS
In this section, we first discuss differential information theory. This theory 
can link stock price reaction to firm size. We then review signaling theory, 
in particular, those models that are cited as explaining the announcement 
period returns for stock offerings that reduce debt. The predictions of these
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models are not based on firm size, but on information asymmetries between 
insiders and outsiders.
Arguments for a Differential Information Effect
Models premised on differential information (Atiase, 1980; Klein & 
Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975) suggest that announcements by small firms can 
disseminate greater information, for example, in regards to identifying 
mispriced securities. Misvaluation occurs when the current market value of 
securities does not reflect the true value of the firm’s future estimated cash 
flows. As argued by Klein and Bawa (1977), investors will find it more diffi­
cult to estimate future cash flows if there is less information about a firm. 
Thus, greater misvaluation can exist for small firms given that less is known 
about their future cash flows.
Several argum ents exist to support the prem ise tha t small firm  
announcements convey greater information about security misvaluation. 
first, privately developed information regarding small firms is costly. Atiase 
(1980) asserts that the information search for small firms is more expensive 
compared to large firms. Thus, private information gathering for small 
firms will be limited making their announcements more revealing. This 
limited information gathering notion is consistent with Collins, Kothari, 
and Rayburn (1987) who suggest that firm size proxies for the number of 
professional analysts and traders processing the available information 
about a firm.
Second, there is less available public news on small firms. In particular, 
studies (Atiase, 1980; Atiase, Bamber, & Rreeman, 1988; Grant, 1980) find 
that the financial press publishes fewer items on small firms than on large 
firms. As discussed by Atiase, Bamber, and Freeman (1988), the SEC and 
FASB have differential disclosure requirements that typically exempt small 
firms from certain disclosures.
Extant research supports the assertion that firm size is a determinant of 
stock returns. Most of this research (Atiase, 1985; Chari, Jaganathan, 8c 
Ofer, 1988; Zeghal, 1984) centers on earnings announcements. These stud­
ies show that small firms (relative to large firms) experience greater positive 
returns around earnings announcement dates. ^  Tliese findings are consis­
tent with the notion that the earnings announcements for small firms con­
tain more information. More recently, the research by Chandy, Peavy, and 
Reichenstein (1993) finds that the strength of the market response to stocks 
highlighted in Ihlue Line depends on firm size.They state that the response 
is more positive for small firms because less information exists for small 
firms than for large firms.
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Finally, the firm size research calls attention to the fact that differential 
stock price reaction is not confined to NYSE/AMEX firms. For example, 
Atiase (1985) finds a differential reaction to quarterly earnings announce­
ments between small and large firm announcements equally within the 
NYSE/AMEX and OTC markets. Thus, there is reason to believe that a dif­
ferential information effect may exist for other events involving the OTC 
market (e.g., OTC stock offering announcements).
Arguments for Signaling Effects
Signaling or information asymmetry models (Fama, 1985; Leland & 
Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) are predicated on the notion that insider actions 
can convey to market participants security misvaluation. Based on their 
estimates about future expected cash flows, insiders may feel the stock price 
is not representative of the true value. One major means of communicating 
this misvaluation is through leverage changes where firms issue and retire 
security types.
In regards to pure leverage decreases, signaling models predict that 
stock for debt transactions can convey security overvaluation. For example, 
the Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling model predicts that stock ojBFerings 
signal unfavorable information about security value if the market suspects 
insiders are lowering their ownership proportions. Insiders attain lower rel­
ative holdings by concurrently selling shares through a secondary offering 
(or by not purchasing the new issue). The debt level signaling model of Ross 
(1977) suggests that stock for debt transactions convey security overvalua­
tion because market participants will perceive that the firm’s future cash 
flows may not be sufficient to service current debt levels. The extent of the 
negative news increases as the relative amount of debt retired increases. 
Bank debt signaling models (Bernanke, 1983; Fame, 1985) argue that bank­
ers signal inside information by their decisions concerning bank loans. 
These models suggest bank debt reductions will signal greater negative 
news than nonbank debt reductions. This is because the market fears bank 
debt reductions are caused by bankers who want to unfavorably revise loans, 
or who refuse to extend loans.^
The pure leverage decrease research (Copeland & Lee, 1991; Cornett 
& Travlos, 1989; Hull, 1994; Hull 8c Moellenberndt, 1994; Israel, Ofer, & 
Siegel, 1989; Masulis, 1983) suggests that signaling models best explain 
announcement period returns. For example, a debt level signaling effect as 
hypothesized by Ross (1977) is suggested by Masulis (1983) and Hull 
(1994). A change in ownership signaling effect consistent with Leland and 
Pyle (1977) is mentioned by Cornett and Travlos (1989) and Hull (1994). A
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bank debt signaling effect in support of Fama (1985) is found by Hull and 
Moellenberndt (1994). For some of their tests, the latter study also finds 
support for Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977).^
Firm Size and OTC Stock Offerings 35
III. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND PRIMARY TESTS
This section describes the data, methodology, and tests. The primary 
sources of common stock offering announcements are the Investment Dealers' 
Digest and The Wall Street Journal.^ Sources for the descriptive data are (in 
addition to the two above sources): Compustat Annual Files, Moody’s Indus­
trial Manuals, and CRSP NASDAQ  ^Price Files. The time period covered by 
these sources is from 1973 to 1989.
Data
The sample consists of 179 common stock offerings that survive the fol­
lowing four screens.
1. Each must be identified as a pure leverage decrease where a 
common stock offering is undertaken to retire non-convertible 
debt.
2. Each must have available data from the sources to calculate values 
for firm size (described later) and the planned reduction in debt.
3. Each must be listed on the CRSP NASDAQ^ Return File and be 
trad ed  du rin g  the announcem ent and estim ation  periods 
(described later).
4. The planned percentage change in outstanding common stock 
must lie between a half percent and one hundred percent.
Table 1 reports descriptive data for the total sample and two halves 
(“small” and “large”) formed according to firm size. Observations in the 
small half consist of the 89 observations with the smallest values for firm 
size. The remaining 90 observations have the largest firm size values and 
form the large half. Rrm size includes equity value and debt value. Equity 
value consists of the market value of common stock and the liquidation 
value of preferred stock (if applicable). Debt value is comprised of the book 
value of all long-term debt obligations and current liabilities.^
Since firm size is measured in dollars and a dollar can decline substan­
tially in real value (e.g., purchasing power) over two decades, values for firm 
size are adjusted bfefore observations are classified intoeither the small or
Table 1
Descriptive Data for 179 Over-the-Counter Common Stock 
Offerings that Reduce Nonconvertible Debt, 1973-1989
Total Sample Small FintfSize Large Krmf’ Size 
Descriptive Data (n=179) Half(n=^89) H alf(n=90)
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Panel A: Time Profile
Observations for 1973-1976 32 (18%)*^ 24 (27%) 8 (9%)
Observations for 1977-1979 31 (17%) 20 (22%) 11 (12%)
Observations for 1980-1982 74 (41%) 32 (36%) 42 (47%)
Observations for 1983-1985 34 (19%) 12 (14%) 22 (24%)
Observations for 1986-1989 8 (4%) 1 (1%) 7 (8%)
Panel B: Selected Characteristics
Firm Size $142M® $40M I243M
($74M) ($38M) ($150M)
Planned Offering Size ^ $15M $7M $22M
($9M) ($6M) ($15M)
Par Value of the Planned Debt -13.9% -18.1% -9.5%
Reduction Dividend by Hrm Size (-12.1%) (-15.9%) (-9.6%)
Planned Percentage Change in 22.7% 27.6% 17.6%
Outstanding Common Shares (18.7%) (25.4%) (14.2%)
Notes:  ^This half contains observations in the total sample with the smallest firm size values.
 ^This half contains observations in the total sample with the largest firm size values.
 ^The parenthesis gives the percentage of the column's total number of observations.
 ^Includes equity value and debt value. Equity value consists of the market value of common 
stock and
liquidation value of preferred stock (if apphcable). Debt value is comprised of the book value 
of long-term debt obligations and current liabilities. Values are taken from  sources nearest (yet 
prior) to announcement date and adjusted assuming a five percent compounded annual 
decrease in the value of a dollar over time. See the Appendix for details on the adjustment 
procedure.
 ^Means (medians) are reported. M represents millions.
 ^Price the day before the announcement times the planned number of new or primary shares.
large half. The adjustment procedure assumes that the value of a dollar 
declines at an annual compounded rate of five percent. The Appendix 
details the adjustment procedure.
The time profile given in Panel A of Table 1 reveals that 41 percent of 
the total sample occurs between the years 1980 and 1982. For these years, 
36 percent of the small half and 47 percent of the large half are found. The 
panel also shows that observations for the small half are more likely to be 
found in the 1970s, while those for the lai^e half are more apt to occur in 
the 1980s.
Panel B reports that mean values for “firm size” and “planned offering 
size” for the small half are less than one-sixth and one-third of the mean 
values for the large half. This panel also reveals that observations in the 
small half undergo relatively greater changes in levels of debt and common 
stock. For example, the small half s means for “par value of the planned 
debt reduction divided by firm size” and “planned percentage change in 
outstanding common shares” are about 90 percent and 55 percent greater 
in magnitude than the corresponding means for the laige half.
The sample includes 60 combination offerings. An observation is clas­
sified as a combination offering when a primary offering is accompanied by 
a registered secondary offering that is at least 10 percent of the total offer­
ing (e.g., primary plus secondary components). Of the 60 combination 
offerings, there are 34 in the small half and 26 in the large half.
The sample is also characterized by the inclusion of 90 offerings where 
the debt being retired is identified as bank debt. Of these 90 offerings, there 
are 39 in the small half and 51 in the large half. The occurrence of a com­
bination offering is as likely for a bank debt reductionas for a non-bank debt 
reduction.
Finally, of the 179 offerings, there are 12 that are non-cash offerings 
(e.g., cash is not raised for the debt reduction but the new shares are given 
in return for outstanding debt). The 12 non-cash offerings consist of eight 
private swaps and four exchange offers. The findings of this study are sim­
ilar with or without these 12 observations included.
Methodology and Primary Tests
The ordinary least squares (OLS) market model procedure described by 
Brown and Warner (1985) is used to test the hypothesis that a sample’s 
mean daily excess stock return (ER) or cumulative excess stock return (CER) 
is equal to zero. The alphas and betas are calculated using the value- 
weighted CRSP NASDAQ index in conjunction with an estimation period of 
Days -1-40 to -1-240 after the announcement date (e.g., after Event Day 0). 
Although not reported, similar ERs and CERs are found when using 
Scholes and Williams (1977) OLS alphas and betas, a 200 day comparison 
period before the announcem ent dates, or the CRSP NASDAQ equal- 
weighted index.
To test the null hypothesis that the mean return for a small firm size 
group is less negative or equal to the mean return for a large firm size 
group, a standard parametric one-tailed t statistic for testing the equality of 
the means of two non-paired samples is calculated. The research hypothesis 
is that the small firm size group will have a greater negative return (e.g., the
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test statistic will be negative). When calculating t statistics, variances are 
assumed unequal if F values reject the hypothesis that portfolio variances 
are equal. Non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum z statistics are also given.
For the OLS regression tests, we report robust t statistics, F values, and
values. The White (1980) heteroskedasticit)^ adjustmentprocedure is fol­
lowed when calculating robust ^-statistics. One-tailed ^-statistics are given 
for explanatory variables since each has a definite prediction concerning 
the sign of its coefficient.
IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents our empirical findings. A series of tests demonstrate 
that a differential information effect, linked to firm size, is a significant fac­
tor when accounting for the stock price behavior of OTC firms that issue 
common stock to retire nonconvertible debt.
Excess Return Results
Panel A in Table 2 reports daily excess stock return (ER) results for a 
seven day event period that includes event Days -3 through -H3. The panel 
reveals a -3.46 percent cumulative excess return (CER) for the total sample 
during the seven day period. Most of the negative activity (-1.89 percent) 
occurs on the announcement day. We also find substantial negative activity 
on Day -1-1 (-0.92 percent). The latter is explained by the fact that the mar­
ket can be closed on the day of the announcement. There is also evidence 
of leakage or late reporting, as significant negative ERs occur for event 
Days -1 and -2.
In looking at the “small firm size half’ and “large firm size half’ col­
umns in Table 2, we see that the negative market response is especially evi­
dent for the smaller firms. A simple comparison of the two columns 
indicates that substantial differences exist between the magnitude of the 
daily returns. The last column in Table 2 reveals that statistical significant 
differences in ERs between the small and large firm size halves exist for 
Event Days 0 and -I-1. Although daily excess return (ER) differences are not 
significant, the small half also has greater negative ERs for EventDays -1 
and -1-2. For these four event days (Days -1 through -1-2) for which the small 
half experiences greater negative ERs, the small half has a more negative 
cumulative excess return (CER) of -2.57 percent.
Panel B in Table 2 gives CER results for the three event days consisting 
of Days -1 through +1. The panel reveals that there is a -2.24 percent dif­
ference when subtracting the three-day CER for the large half from the
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Table 2
Excess Stock Return Results for 179 Over-the-Counter Stock 
Offerings that Reduce Nonconvertible Debt, 1973-1989
Event
Day(s) Total Sample (n=179)
Small Firm 
Size H alf(n=89)
Large Firm 
Size H alf (n=90)
Small H alf vs 
Large H alf
Panel A: Daily Excess Return Results
-3 0.07%; 0.39® 0.35%; 1.30 -0.20%; -0.80® 1.49; 1771^*
49%; -0.22 48%; -0.32 50%; 0.00 0.86
-2 -0.52%; -2.52** -0.52%;-1.61 -0.51%; -2.02** -0.02; 167
36%; -3.66*** 31%; -3.50*** 41%;-1.69* -0.97
-1 -0.47% ;-1.73* -0.55% ;-1.20 -0.38%;-1.35 -0.32; 145
42%;-2.17** 40%; -1.80* 43%; -1.26 -1.20
0^ -1.89%;-6.08*** -2.40%; -4.97*** -1.39%; -3.56*** -1.63; 176**
31%; -5.01*** 28%; -4.13*** 34%; -2.95*** -1.40*
1 -0.92%; -3.40*** -1.45%;-3.75*** -0.39%; -1.05 -1.97; 176**
37%;-3.51*** 31%; -3.50*** 42%;-1.48 -2.07**
2 -0.06%; -0.26 -0.23%; -0.61 0.10%; 0.31 -0.67; 177
45%;-1.42 39%; -2.01** 50%; 0.00 -0.92
3 0.33%; 1.54 0.30%; 0.92 0.36%; 1.29 -0.14; 177
53%; 0.82 51%; 0.11 56%; 1.05 -0.77
Binel B: Three—Day Cumulative Excess Return Results
-3.28%; -7.45*** -4.40%;-6.41*** -2.16%; -4.08*** -2.56; 166***
27%; -6.05*** 24%; -4.98*** 31%; -3.58*** -3.24***
Notes: Three asterisks (***), two asterisks (**), and one asterisk (*) denote significance at the one, 
five, and and 1 0  percent levels, respectively.
 ^The first row reports the mean excess stock return followed by the two-tailed t statistic (when 
testing if the mean excess stock return equals zero). The second row gives the percent of the 
sample that has a positive excess stock return followed by the two-tailed binomial z statistic 
(when testing if the percent equals 50 percent).
 ^The first row reports the one-tailed parametric t statistic (when testing the null hypothesis 
that excess stock returns for the small group is less negative or equal to excess stock returns 
for the large group) followed by the degrees of fireedom. The third row reports the z statistic 
for the one-tailed nonparametric Wilcoxon test.
 ^Day 0 is the announcement day. Assuming no leakage or late reporting, the announcement 
is expected to impact the market on Day 0 or, if the announcement occurs after the market is 
closed, on Day -h 1.
three-day CER for the small half. This difference is significant at the one 
percent level for both the parametric and non-parametric tests. Although 
not reported in Panel B, the same results are found for other announce­
ment periods including two-day CERs and four-day CERs.
If a firm size effect is present, then it should be stronger if groups are 
compared that have greater differences in firm size. We find this to be true.
Although not reported in table format, tests are conducted when the sam­
ple is partitioned into groups other than halves. For these tests, even stron­
ger evidence that small firms have greater negative ERs and CERs is 
discovered. For example, the three-day CER difference of -2.24 percent 
found for halves increases in magnitude to -3.10 percent when those one- 
fourth sample observations that have the smallest firm sizes (n=45) are 
compared with those one-fourth sample observations that have the greatest 
firm sizes (n=45). When the sample is partitioned into eighths, the three- 
day CER difference increases in magnitude to -3.65 percent. Furthermore, 
the group consisting of those one-eighth observations (n=22) with the larg­
est firm sizes has a three-day CER that is not statistically significant from 
zero (t = -1.08).
The Regression Model
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression tests are conducted to explain 
the announcement period returns of OTC stock offerings thatreduce non- 
convertible debt. The general regression model is:
CER = bo + biLFS + b^SIZ + bsCOM -h b4BAN + b^LEV
where CER is the three-day cumulative excess stock re tu rn  that 
includes Days -1, 0, and -1-1.
LFS is the logarithm of firm size. (Firm size is defined in Table 
1 and is expressed in millions of dollars.)
SIZ is a dummy variable that equals zero if in small firm size 
half, or equals one if in large firm size half.
COM is a dummy variable that equals zero if a primary offering, 
or equals one if a combination offering.
BAN is a dummy variable that equals zero if the debt reduction 
is identified as a bank debt reduction, or equals one if the 
debt reduction is not identified as a bank debt reduction.
LEV is the par value of the planned reduction in debt divided 
by firm size.
The five explanatory variables are chosen in order to compare a differential 
information effect (based on firm size) with three signaling effects that prior 
research has found to be explain pure leverage decreases.
The first two variables (LFS and SIZ) are motivated by a desire to test 
for a wealth effect stemming from an observation’s firm size. Differential 
information theory (Atiase, 1980; Klein & Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975) pre­
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diets positive coefficients for both variables. Since market participants know 
less about the future cash flow possibilities for small firms, a more negative 
stock return for a negative news release (such as a stock offering announce­
ment) is expected for small firms.
The last three explanatory variables (COM, BAN, and LEV) attempt to 
test valuation effects associated with signaling models (Fama, 1985; Leland 
& Pyle 1977; Ross, 1977) premised on information asymmetries between 
insiders and outsiders. The motivation for testing these three variables is 
supplied by the stock offering research that suggests signaling models best 
explain announcement period CERs for pure leverage decreases. Details on 
these three variables and their predicted coefficient signs are given below.
A signaling model predicated on changes in inside ownership propor­
tions (such as Leland & Pyle, 1977) predicts a negative coefficient for COM. 
For combination offerings, the market will be apprehensive that insiders are 
among those selling secondary shares. Although published reports in the 
financial press are typically vague in just referring to those selling as “cur­
rent” or “principal” shareholders, investors (as a protective measure) would 
likely assume that insiders are among those selling. This is particular true 
for the 60 combination offerings in our sample where secondary sales aver­
age about half of primary sales.^
A signaling model emphasizing the role of bankers (such as Fama, 1985) 
predicts a positive coefficient for BAN. If bank debt offerings reflect favor­
able inside information by bankers, then bank debt reductions should be 
viewed unfavorably. For those 90 observations in our sample that retire 
bank debt, investors are likely to believe that the reductions are caused by 
bankers who want to unfavorably revise loans, or who refuse to extend loans.
A signaling model premised on relative changes in debt levels (such as 
Ross, 1977) predicts a positive coefficient for LEV Greater negative values 
for LEV are expected to be accompanied by greater negative signaling 
effects. This is because market participants are likely to infer greater nega­
tive news as the relative amount of the debt reduction increases.^
Correlation Results
Pearson and Spearman correlation tests reveal several pairs of explana­
tory variables that have sufficiently large correlation coefficients (rhos) to 
cause potential colinearity problems.^ First, as expected, the two firm size 
variables (LFS and SIZ) are correlated. The Pearson (Spearman) rho is 0.79 
(0.87). Because of this extremely large correlation, each variable is tested 
separately when conducting regression tests on the total sample.
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Second, LEV is significantly correlated with LFS and SIZ. This is true 
for tests conducted on the total sample, as well as for tests performed on 
either the small firm size half (e.g., when SIZ=0) or the large firm size half 
(e.g., when SIZ=1). For all of the correlation tests between LEV and the 
firm size variables, the Pearson and Spearman rhos range firom 0.37 to 0.62. 
Because these values exhibit substantial m agnitudes, regression tests 
(reported in Table 3) are conducted with these variables used jointly and 
separately.
Regression Results
Panel A in Table 3 reports regression results for the total sample. The 
first firm size variable tested is LFS. The results of this test are reported in 
the first row. The coefficient for LFS is the only coefficient that is significant 
at the one percent level. This suggests that a firm size effect is a dominant 
effect relative to <)ther tested effects. The coefficients for COM and BAN are 
significant at the five percent level. This indicates that signaling effects 
stemming firom changes in ownership proportions and the type of retired 
debt (e.g., bank debt versus non-bank debt) are also important. The coeffi­
cient for LEV is not significant implying that the relative size of the debt 
retired is less important than firm size, insider sales, or banker actions.
The test reported in the first row of Panel A is repeated with the second 
firm size variable (SIZ) replacing LFS. These results are reported in the sec­
ond row. Once again, the coefficient for the firm size variable is significant 
at the one percent level. Thus, a simple dummy variable is able to capture 
valuation effects attributed to firm size. The results for the other variables 
(COM, BAN, and LEV) in the second row are like those reported in the first 
row.
When the tests in the first two rows of Panel A are repeated with LEV 
deleted, the third and fourth rows reveal that coefficients for the remaining 
explanatory variables keep their same significant levels. These two rows 
reveal that deleting LEV increases the F value, while leaving the value 
virtually unchanged.
The fifth and last row in Panel A presents the results when the test is 
conducted without either of the two firm size variables included. This row 
reveals that the results are not materially altered in that the coefficient for 
LEV remains insignificant and the coefficients for COM and BAN are still 
significant at the five percent level. Any potential colinearity when LEV is 
used with the firm size variables does not influence the significance levels. 
However, when either LFS or SIZ is not included in the test, the fifth row 
shows that the coefficient sign for LEV changes and values for the and 
F fall noticeably.
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Panel B in Table 3 reports results for the small firm size half (e.g., those 
observations where SIZ = 0 holds). Adjusted and F values reported in 
this panel fall considerably compared to the previous panel. The first row 
in Panel B shows that the coefficients for LFS, COM, BAN, and LEV are all 
greater in magnitude than found for the test in the first row of Panel A. 
However, the smaller sample size results in a less powerful test. The t statis­
tics for LFS, COM, and BAN fall in magnitude. The coefficients for LFS 
and COM are now only significant at the 10 percent level, while BAN 
remains significant at the five percent level.
The second row in Panel B reports that, when LEV is deleted, the coef­
ficient for LFS is no longer significant while the coefficients for COM and 
BAN are significant at the five percent level. The third row shows that delet­
ing LFS produces results for COM, BAN, and LEV that are very similar to 
those in the first row.
Panel C in Table 3 presents results for the large firm size half (e.g., 
those observations where SIZ = 1 holds). The and F values in this panel 
fall noticeably compared to the previous panel, with the values no longer 
significant. The only variable in Panel C with a significant coefficient is 
LEV It now has its predicted positive sign and is significant at the 10 per­
cent level. Thus, the findings for the large firms are quite different from the 
small firms. The results for LEV indicate that the only evidence for a signal­
ing effect is that predicated on the relative degree of the leverage change.
Consistent with differential information theory (Atiase, 1980; Klein & 
Bawa, 1977; Wilson, 1975), the regression tests in Table 3 show firm size as 
a significant explanatory factor when tests are conducted on the total sam­
ple. For these tests, there is a greater variation in firm sizes. However, when 
samples with fewer observations are tested (e.g., the small or large firm size 
halves), the firm size variable is only marginally significant or insignificant. 
These tests also demonstrate that the market response is more negative 
when common stock offerings of small OTC firms are accompanied by sec­
ondary sales or are involved with reducing bank debt. For large OTC firms, 
the market appears to be primarily concerned about the relative decrease 
in the debt level. Thus, it appears that the signaling models posited by 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Fama (1985) are more applicable for small 
OTC firms, while the signaling model of Ross (1977) is more applicable for 
lai^e OTC firms.
Small Versus Large Sample Comparisons
Our next series of tests attempt to fiirther determine if a differential 
information effect, attributable to firm size, is important. We compare
Krm Size and OTC Stock Offerings 43
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CERs for small and large firm size groups when signaling efifects (found to 
be significant in the regression tests) are not expected to influence the out­
come. For example, the tests are designed so that homogeneity (concerning 
the degree of insider trading, the bank versus non-bank debt nature of the 
debt reduction, and the degree of leverage change) exists for the groups 
being compared.
To assess if a firm size effect holds regardless of the presence of insider 
trading, we separately examine the primary offering sample (n=119) and 
the combination offering sample (n=60). It can be noted, that when the 
combination sample is divided into small and large firm size groups, the 
secondary offering as a percent of the total offering is virtually the same for 
both groups. Thus, any differences in CERs (that occur) cannot likely be 
attributed to differences in the amount insider sales. To determine the 
impact of firm size regardless of the degree of bank debt signaling, we sep­
arately test the bank debt reduction sample (n=90) and the non-bank debt 
reduction sample (n=89). Finally, we control for the degree of the leverage 
change by comparing small and large firm size groups when values for LEV 
(the planned reduction in debt divided by firm size) are similar. Since small 
firms undergo relatively greater reductions in debt levels, the procedure 
described below is used to make LEV values similar for the small and large 
firm size groups being compared.
We first take the small firm size half (n=89) and delete those one-third 
observations (n=29) that have the most negative values for LEV We then 
take the large firm size half (n=90) and delete those one-third observations 
(n=30) that have the least negative values for LEV This deletion process 
produces small and large firm size groups that have similar values for LEV 
For example, the mean, median, and standard deviation for LEV are -12.8, 
-12.6, and 4.1 percent for the small group. The respective values are -12.3, 
-12.0, and 3.8 percent for the large group.
Table 4 presents the results for small versus large firm size group com­
parisons described above. The “small firm size group” colurrm shows that 
the small firm size groups for these samples have parametric and non-para- 
metric statistics for three-day CERs that are statistically significant from 
zero at the one percent level. The magnitude of the negative CERs reported 
in this column are generally about twice the negative magnitudes given in 
the “large firm size group” column for the large firm size groups. The last 
column shows that differences in CERs between the small and large groups 
are significant at the five percent level or better with two exceptions.
The first exception is Test 1 for the combination offering sample. The 
CER difference is only significant at the 10 percent level when comparing 
large and firm size halves. However, the magnitude of the CER difference
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Table 4
Small Rrm Size Versus Large Rrm Size Comparisons for 
OTC Stock Offerings that Reduce Nonconvertible Debt, 1973-1989
Sample^
Test
Small Firm 
Size Group
Large Firm 
Size Group
Small vs 
Large Group
Primary Offerings -3.45% 27*** I’ -1.73%; —2.74*** -1.67**; 110*=
(n=119) 29% -3  25*** 33%; -2.58*** -2  38***
Combination Offerings -5.71% -4.73*** -3.50%; -3.51*** -1.41*; 58
Test 1 (n=60) 13% -4.62*** 27%; -2.56*** -1.57*
Combination Offerings^ -6.37% -5.17*** -2.74%; -2.43** -2.17**; 38
Test 2 (n=40) 10% -3.54*** 30%; -1.79* -2.10**
Bank Debt Reductions -5.16% -5.93*** -3.03%; -4.03*** -1.85**; 88
(n=90) 22% -3.73*** 24%; -3.43*** -1.91**
Non-Bank Debt Reductions -2.97% -2.86*** -1.89%; —2.41*** -0.83; 80
Test 1 (n=89) 27% -3.02*** 36%; -1.94* -1.50*
Non-Bank Debt Reductions^ ^.17% -4  36*** -1.62%; -1.60 -1.83**; 57
Test 2 (n=60) 24% -2.79*** 37%; -1.46 -2.13**
Degree of Leverage Change^ -4.68% -5.28*** -2.41%; -3.35*** -1.99**; 118
(n=120) 20% -4.65*** 28%; -3.36*** -2.73***
Notes: Three asterisks (***), two asterisks (**), and one asterisk (*) denote significance at the one, five, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
 ^Unless noted otherwise, each sample being tested is divided into small and large firm size 
halves.
 ^The first row reports the mean three-day cumulative excess stock return (CER) followed by 
the two-tailed t statistic (when testing if the CER equals zero). The three days include -1,0 (the 
announcement date), and +1. The second row gives the percent of the sample that has a pos­
itive CER followed by the two-tailed binomial z statistic (when testing if the percent equals 50 
percent).
 ^The first row reports the one-tailed parametric t statistic (when testing the null hypothesis 
that the CER for the small group is less negative or equal to the CER for the large group) fol­
lowed by the degrees of freedom. The third row reports the z statistic for the one-tailed non- 
parametric Wilcoxon test.
This test compares groups with greater differences in firm size than found in the first combi­
nation offerings test. It compares those one-third combination offerings that have the smallest 
firm sizes (n=20) with those one-third combination offerings that have the largest firm sizes 
(n=20).
 ^This test compares groups with greater differences in firm size than found in the first non­
bank debt reductions test. It compares those one-third non-bank debt reductions that have the 
smallest firm sizes (n=30) with those one-third non-bank debt reductions that have the largest 
firm sizes (n=30).
^This test compares a small firm size group (n=60) and a large firm size group (n=60) when 
values for LEV (the par value of the planned reduction divided by firm size) are similar for both 
groups. The procedure is described in Section IV prior to presenting the results of this table.
is greater than that found for the primary sample test (-2.21 percent differ­
ence versus -1.72 percent difference) even though the average difference in 
firm sizes for its groups is $119 million less than that for the primary sample
groups. Test 2 for the combination offering sample compares groups with 
greater differences in firm size than found in Test 1. It does this by comparing 
those one-third combination offerings that have the smallest firm sizes 
(n=2  0) with those one-third combination offerings that have the largest firm 
sizes (n=20). For this comparison, Table 4 reveals that both parametric and 
non-parametric tests are significant at the five percent level.
The second exception is Test 1 for the non-bank debt reduction sample. 
The CER difference is only significant at the 10 percent level for the non- 
parametric test when comparing lai^e and firm size halves. The average 
difference in firm sizes for its groups is $83 million less than that for the 
bank debt sample groups. Test 2 compares groups with a greater difference 
in firm sizes than found in Test I . This is done by comparing those one- 
third non-bank debt reductions that have the smallest firm sizes (n=30) 
with those one-third non-bank debt reductions that have the largest firm 
sizes (n=30). Like Test 2 for the combination offerings, Test 2 for the non­
bank debt reductions produces parametric and non-parametric statistics 
that are significant at the five percent level.
Besides the significant coefficients for LEV found in Panel C for Table
3, the degree of leverage change test is important due to the correlation 
that exists between firm size variables (LFS and SIZ) with the relative size of 
the leverage change variable (LEV). This test yields parametric and non- 
parametric statistics that are significant at the five and one percent levels. 
These results show that firm size is a significant factor even when small and 
large firm size groups undergo leverage changes that are similar. The 
results are not biased by the presence of insider sales and banker actions, as 
the number of combination offerings and bank debt reductions are similar 
for both groups. Although not reported, the support for a size effect is still 
evident when other relative sizevariables (resembling LEV) are analyzed in 
a like manner.
The Relationship between Firm Size and Issuance Expenses
It is possible that support for a firm size effect can be explained by issu­
ance expenses if the expenses impact stock prices at the time of the 
announcement, and the impact is sufficiently greater for small OTC firms. 
Hull and Fortin (1993) offer insight into variables that can be tested to 
determine the impact of issuance expenses on announcement period CERs. 
They derive a flotation cost adjusted measure (ADJ) that, when added to 
CER, gives an adjusted CER representing the fall in stock price if issuance 
expenses are zero. ADJ can be expressed as -l*COS*SHR where COS is the 
issuance expenses per new share and SHR is the planned percentage
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change in outstanding common stock. The values calculated for ADJ are 
positive since COS is negative (to represent the negative cash flow associ­
ated with issuance expenses) and SHR is positive.
Before using ADJ and its two components (e.g., the variables, SHR and 
COS) to determine if issuance expenses can account for CERs, we perform 
correlation analysis since we suspect colinearity if ADJ or SHR is used with 
LEV This suspicion is confirmed. For example, the Pearson (Spearman) 
rhos between LEV and ADJ are: -0.50 (-0.63) for the total sample; -0.42 
(-0.43) for the small firm size half; and, -0.25 (-0.42) for the large firm size 
half. Rhos between SHR and ADT are even greater in magnitude ranging 
from -0.60 to -0.76.
Since the correlation between ADJ and LEV is substantial, we repeat the 
tests in Tables 3 and 4 with ADJ replacing LEV We find that ADJ yields 
results sim ilar to LEV with support for size and signaling effects 
unchanged. Tests are also repeated with SHR replacing LEV Once again, 
results are similar (reflecting the fact SHR is highly correlated with both 
ADJ and LEV). However, when tests are conducted with COS, results 
change. The results are summarized below.
Correlation analysis discovers that rhos between COS and LFS are high 
compared to those between COS and relative size variables (e.g., LEV or 
SHR). For the total sample test, the Pearson (Spearman) rho between COS 
and LFS is 0.45 (0.51), while the rho between COS and LEV is 0.13 (0.23) 
and between COS and SHR is -0.12 (-0.25). The differences (in rhos between 
COS and LFS compared to those between COS and relative size variables) 
remain when the small and large halves are analyzed.
For the total sample regression tests, using COS with firm size variables 
cause colinearity problems as coefficients for COS and firm size variables 
fall considerably in magnitude. Replacing firm size with COS produces 
results for COS that are similar to firm size. The rhos betiveen COS and firm 
size, along with their similar regression results, leave open the possibility 
that firm size may be capturing negative issuance expenses (in addition to 
a differential information effect). However, this interpretation raises several 
questions. Why do we not observe stronger results for ADJ? Is it because sta­
tistical significant support for ADJ is weakened by the possibility that a sub­
stantial number of sample observations capture positive leverage-related 
effects (e.g., as might result if onerous debt covenants are retired)? Future 
research needs to explore variables capable of capturing positive leverage- 
related wealth effects.
To further examine the relationship between a size effect and issuance 
expenses, a test similar to that reported in Table 4 for the degree of leverage 
change is conducted. When small and large firm size groups are formed
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(similar to that described for the degree of leverage change test) such that 
COS values are equal, mixed support is found for a size effect. When three- 
day CERs for the small and large firm size groups are compared, the para­
metric test is insignificant {t = -1.16) but the non-parametric test is signifi­
cant at the five percent level (z = -1.97). Future research needs to continue 
to explore if (and to what degree) a firm size effect captures an issuance 
expenses effect.
V. SUMMARY
We examine 179 OTC stock offerings that reduce nonconvertible debt. We 
find that small firms (relative to large firms) experience more negative stock 
returns for announcements of common stock offerings that retire noncon­
vertible debt. This is especially evident when samples with larger differences 
in firm size are compared. To the extent firm size represents firms with less 
available information, our findings are consistent with a differential infor­
mation effect.
Regression tests on the total sample indicate that a firm size effect is a 
dominant effect. There is also evidence that signaling effects, based on 
changes in insider ownerships and in actions by bankers, explain stock 
returns. This is especially evident when the small half is tested. Results for 
the large firm half differ. For these regression tests, any possible signaling 
effect can only be linked to the reduction in the relative level of debt. For 
larger firms, the market appears to be more concerned with the relative 
amount of the debt reduction as opposed to what insiders might be doing.
Additional tests further show that a differential information effect, 
linked to firm size, is a dominant effect. For example, statistical significant 
support for a firm size effect is evident when we examine samples designed 
so that other signaling effects (e.g., those stemming from changes in insider 
ownership, banker actions, and debt levels) are not expected to bias results. 
The results of these tests (along with prior tests) point out that the strength 
of a firm size effect depends upon the size of the sample. This is because 
samples with more observations can produce groups with greater differ­
ences in firm sizes.
Finally, we offer some evidence to suggest that a firm size effect may be 
at least partially explained by issuance expenses. Future research needs to 
further explore this possibility. A good starting point would be senior secu­
rity offerings (such as debt offerings) where issuance expenses are not typi­
cally large. If a firm size effect is found for this sample, then additional (and 
stronger) support for a differential information effect could be established.
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APPENDIX 
Classifying Observations Based on Firm Size
Before classifying an observation according to firm size, its firm size is 
adjusted by recognizing the fact that firm size is measured in dollars and a 
dollar’s worth of firm value can decline substantially over two decades. For 
example, a $100 million firm in 1977 is relatively larger than a $100 million 
firm in 1985. To compare reported firm size values for these two years with­
out adjusting the values may produce erroneous conclusions.
For a firm that announces a stock offering during or prior to 1980, we 
adjust its firm size by multiplying by an adjustment factor (/IF) given as
= (1 + r f
where r  represents the annual compounded rate of decline in the value of 
the dollar, and the exponent (n) is equal to the base year of 1980 minus the 
year of announcement.
To illustrate, assume the following: firm size is reported by sources as 
$100M (M = million) at the time of the announcement; the annual com­
pounded rate of decline in the dollar (r) is 0.05; and, the announcement 
occurs in 1977 which is three years before the base year. Given that w is 3 
(e.g., 1980 - 1977 = 3), theny4i^ is 1.05^ and the adjusted firm size is 
$100M*1.05^or (to the nearest million) $116M.
Now, keep the above numbers except assume the announcement occurs 
in 1985 which is five years after the base year. The value for n is now -5 (e.g., 
1980 - 1985 = -5). Thus, AF is 1.05"^ and the adjusted firm size is 
$I00M*1.05'^ (or $100M/1.05^) which is about $78M.
Like the illustration, this study assumes a five percent compounded 
annual decrease in the value of a dollar over time and a base year of 1980. 
However, the findings are similar if a zero percent or a 10 percent decrease 
in dollar value is used. The similar results (for either 0, 5, or 10 percent) 
can be at least partially attributed to the fact that about two-thirds of the 
observations are clustered between the years 1978 and 1983. Thus, firm 
sizes for these observations are not substantially altered when adjusted.
After an observation’s firm size has its dollar value adjusted, it can be 
ranked by its adjusted firm size and placed in a size group. In this study, we 
perform statistical tests by taking the particular sample being considered 
and placing each observation into one of two groups. For most tests, we only 
consider a grouping into halves. Thus, observations with the smallest firm 
size values are placed in the “small half,” while those with the largest firm
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size values are put in the '‘large half.” For tests that seek to compare samples 
with greater differences, groups other than halves are used. This causes 
observations with middle firm size values to be discarded.
52 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 4(1) 1995
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This paper has benefited from presentations at the International Sympo­
sium on Small Firm Finance and Washburn School of Business. We would 
like to thank D. Forsaith of Flinders University of South Australia, R. Kerch- 
ner of Washburn University, Mwangi Macharia, and two anonymous refer­
ees for helpful suggestions.
NOTES
1. Atiase, Bamber, and Freeman (1988) summarize the research that indicates the relation 
between accounting earnings announcements and aggregate investor reactions 
depends on firm size. They note that this finding has emerged consistently fi:'om 
research based on samples involving different time periods, different security 
exchanges, and different definitions of “small” versus “large.”
2. Although less frequently cited than signaling models, negative stock returns are also 
consistent with other competing models. For example, a price pressure model predicts 
a negative stock return for an increased supply of stock assuming a downward sloping 
demand curve. An issuance expenses model predicts negative stock returns if 
stockholders, as residual owners, bear the costs of floating a new issue. Tax models, 
rooted in the Modigliani and Miller (1963) model, predict a negative effect due to loss 
tax shields. Optimal capital structure models (Jensen 8c Meckling, 1976; Kraus 8c 
Litzenberger, 1973) predict a negative return if firms are moving away from optimal 
debt levels.
3. Stock offerings research (Asquith 8c Mullins, 1986; Dierkens, 1991; Masulis 8c Korwar, 
1986) where cash is raised to change the asset structure also finds general support for 
asymmetric information signaling models. This line of research generally mentions 
signaling models (Miller 8c Rock, 1985;Myers 8c Majluf, 1984) predicated on new 
financing that is directed at changing the asset structure. Such signaling models are not 
generally applicable when analyzing pure leverage changes. This research also cites 
support for the Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling model (since its prediction is 
independent of the purpose of the offering). For the Dierkens (1991) study, one of her 
asymmetric information variables may very well proxy for firm size (and thus be 
capturing a differential information effect). This variable is a dummy variable set equal 
to one when the firm has 16 or less announcements listed in the Wall Street Journal Index 
for the year prior to the equity issue announcement. This dummy variable fares better 
than other asymmetric information variables. This is true when tested either separately 
or simultaneously with other asymmetric variables.
4. Publication in The Wall Street Journal of the planned offering typically lags by one day 
the announcement date given by other sources (such as the Investment Dealers' Digest) 
that gather or publish information after the fact. Thus, for those 38 observations for
which The Wall Street Journal is the only source, the day before the date of publication 
is taken as the announcement date.
5. Empirical results reported in this paper are similar if firm size is measured by the 
market value of common stock.
6. Our findings are also not dependent on the inclusion of 34 observations where the 
announcing firm makes other firm-specific announcements for event days -3 to +3. For 
23 of these cases, the sources disagree as to whether all of the proceeds will be used to 
reduce debt.
7. A negative coefficient for COM may also be consistent with agency models, rooted in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), if insiders include managers. Managers, who lower their 
ownership proportion, are less likely to make wealth maximizing decisions on behalf of 
stockholders. However, since the primary portion of combination offerings is for debt 
reduction purposes, positive agency effects are also possible to the extent debt with 
onerous covenants are retired. Thus, the net agency effect is hard to predict.
8. A positive coefficient for LEV is also consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1963). 
They hypothesize greater tax shield losses as greater amounts of debt are retired. A 
positive coefficient is also consistent with optimal capital structure models (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Kraus &: Litzenberger, 1973) if the stock for debt transaction causes 
the firm to move away from its optimal debt level. However, since optimal models 
hypothesize a negative coefficient when the firm moves closer to its optimal debt level, 
the sign of the coefficient for LEV is difficult to predict based on these models.
9. For the remainder of this paper, rhos between pairs of explanatory regression variables 
are not reported unless there is evident (in particular, from statistical significance and 
sufficient rho magnitudes) to indicate colinearity. To further ascertain colinearity, 
variance inflation factors are calculated for each regression test. Factor values are not 
reported in this paper since the values never exceed 1.63 (which is well below 
conventional levels for indicating multicolinearity). See Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 
(1980) for more details on the relationship between variance inflation factors and 
multicolinearity.
10. As revealed in Table 1, there is a propensity for small firms to occur in the 1970s. For 
this reason, the tests in Table 3 are repeated with a dummy variable (DEC) representing 
the decade of occurrence (1970s versus 1980s) included. DEC is not significant at the 
10 percent level in any of the tests. Also, a dummy variable representing the cash versus 
non-cash offerings is not significant. Finally, tests are conducted with other relative size 
variables suggested by the event study regression research of stock offerings (Asquith 
& Mullins, 1986; Cornett 8c Travlos, 1989; Hull Sc Moellenberndt, 1994; Masulis, 
1983). The results for these variables are generally similar to those reported for LEV.
11. For the results reported in Table 4, each small and large firm size observation is 
classified relative to the sample being tested. Although not reported, similar results are 
found if observations are classified relative to the total sample (n=179).
12. For example, results are unchanged when the percentage change in outstanding shares 
is tested {t = -2.53 and z = -3.29).
13. There are 157 observations for which data is available from the Investment Dealers’ 
Digest to calculate COS. Values for COS range from -16.5 percent to -2.6 percent with 
a mean (median) o f -6.2 (-6.2) percent. Of the 157 observations, there are 77 and 80 in 
the small and large firm size halves. Mean (medians) for the small and large halves are 
-7.0 (-6.9) percent and -5.4 (-5.6) percent.
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